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THE AMERICANS WITH "CERTAIN" DISABILITIES ACT:





Michele recently began working as a certified public accountant for
a large accounting firm. She is epileptic, but fortunately she found a
medication that controls her seizures exceptionally well. Consequently,
she has remained seizure free for nearly ten years. While such medica-
tions sometimes cause serious side effects, she has experienced none
beyond drowsiness in the morning. However, her doctor has told her that
certain types of flickering lights can cause a seizure, particularly fluores-
cent lights. Unfortunately, the light bulbs in her office emit such a
flicker, and she is concerned that she may therefore experience a seizure.
Michele asked her employer to replace the bulbs with a different type of
bulb that would reduce the risk of seizure, but would cost approximately
seventy-five dollars more per year. Her employer refused, and as a result
of her request-which had the effect of informing her employer of her
epilepsy-Michele was turned down for a high profile assignment for
which she was well qualified, in favor of a less qualified colleague.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University of Orlando School of Law. Fulbright
Scholar, Faculty of Law, Doshisha University (Spring/Summer 2001). I would like to thank Charles
Abernathy for his helpful suggestions regarding this article, and Lawrence 0. Gostin for years ago
sparking my interest in disability law.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Barry University of Orlando School of Law.
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Under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("the ADA"),' Michele
would seemingly be entitled to the minimal accommodation she sought
and be protected from the discrimination she suffered. In fact-prior to
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,'
Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,' and Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirking-
burg'-all three agencies charged with implementing the ADA, and most
of the courts that had addressed the issue of whether someone like Mich-
ele is covered by the Act, considered this threshold question a straight-
forward one:5 she would have been covered. Of course, that would only
be the beginning of the inquiry for she would still have to meet the other
provisions of the ADA to win her claim.'
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the Supreme Court's
recent decisions effectively preclude many individuals with impairments
that substantially limit a major life activity from coverage under the
ADA if their disabilities are controlled by mitigating measures such as
medications Therefore, because Michele's medication has kept her sei-
zure free for years, and she suffers no serious side effects from her medi-
cation, it is now possible the ADA, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
does not cover her.8 Thus, her employer need not accommodate her by
replacing the light bulbs, until of course, the current bulbs cause her to
have a seizure; at which point, Michele would likely be considered dis-
abled under the Court's recent decisions and covered under the Act. If,
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994). In determining
whether a plaintiff is covered under the ADA, the first issue is whether the individual has a
"disability," which is defined as "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being
regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). If this threshold question is
answered affirmatively, a court next considers whether the plaintiff is a "qualified individual with a
disability." See infra note 6.
2. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139 (1999).
3. Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133 (1999).
4. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162 (1999).
5. See infra notes 16 & 19 and accompanying text.
6. In the employment context the ADA prohibits discrimination against any "qualified
individual with a disability." Id. § 12112(a). After proving that she is disabled under the Act, a
claimant must also show that she is a "qualified individual" in that she can "with or without
reasonable accommodation . . . perform the essential functions of the employment position [she]
holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). The claimant must prove that the employer acted "because of' the
disability. Id. § 12112(a). The employer has several defenses available. See id. at § 12113. Assuming
Michelle can perform the essential functions of her job, the accommodation of replacing the light
bulbs in her office would appear reasonable.
7. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47; Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137; Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at
2168-69; See infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text (discussing whether a person should be
determined "disabled" in their medicated or unmedicated state). In Sutton, Justice O'Connor
suggests that a well-controlled diabetic would not be covered under the Act-a scenario very similar
to Michelle's well-controlled epilepsy. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
8. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Bragdon might
provide the basis for an argument that Michelle is disabled for ADA purposes, but language from
Sutton is problematic in this regard. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
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under the Supreme Court's interpretation, she is not currently disabled,
her employer could discriminate against her in regard to promotions and
other benefits of employment because she is epileptic unless she can
prove she was "regarded as"9 disabled; a task also complicated by the
Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy.'"
This is an odd result, as a primary motivating force underlying the
employment provisions in Title I of the ADA was the prevention of em-
ployment discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes of disabilities
and disabled individuals." Yet, the ADA's definition of disability under
the Court's approach does not necessarily cover individuals with well-
controlled epilepsy, asthma, diabetes, or other conditions that are treat-
able with medication. This issue is further compounded by aspects of the
Court's approach that may make it harder for some individuals to be
covered under the ADA's provision protecting those "regarded as" hav-
ing a disability.'2
By removing individuals from the ADA's coverage in answering the
threshold question of whether they are disabled, the Court denies them
ADA protection entirely, thus denying them the opportunity to receive
accommodation and even to obtain redress when they are victims of in-
tentional discrimination based on their condition. Even if an accommo-
dation would help avoid problems related to the condition, as in Mich-
ele's case, if those problems have not yet occurred and the individual is
otherwise well-controlled by medication, prosthetics, etc., that individual
is not disabled under the Court's analysis, and thus can not get to the
issue of reasonable accommodation under the Act.'3 And, as the Court
also made it less likely that such individuals will meet the "regarded as"
having a disability standard, even an employer's use of broad-based
stereotypes may not be availing to such individuals.'4 This "one-two
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). A person is "regarded as" having a disability if "(1) a covered
entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting
impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities." Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
Essentially, the covered entity imposes its misperceptions onto the individual. See id.
10. See infra Parts I.A. & I.B. (analyzing the Court's decisions in Sutton and Murphy).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7); see generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans With
Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,415-40 (1991) (outlining the origins of the ADA).
12. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-52 (holding that in order to prove that they were regarded as
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, plaintiffs needed to show that they were
regarded as unable to work in a broad class of jobs); Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137-39 (finding that
plaintiff "has failed to show that he is regarded as unable to perform a class of jobs" and thus that he
had not established that he is "regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working."
Id. at 2139).
13. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47. Of course, if the medication only partially controlled the
effects of the disability or has side effects, and as a result the individual still has an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity, that individual would be covered under the Court's
approach. See id. at 2149.
14. See infra Part ll.B. (discussing the "regarded as" provision under the ADA).
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punch" effectively removes many employees with disabilities from cov-
erage under the ADA, and may actually protect employers who discrimi-
nate based on unfounded stereotypes, misconceptions, or outright ani-
mus.15
All of this might be legally plausible if the text of the ADA, agency
interpretations, legislative history, or ordinary methods of statutory con-
struction supported it. Strikingly-while the Court argues that the text is
clear on the subject-the interpretations of all three agencies charged
with implementing the ADA,'6 and the seemingly clear intent of Con-
gress embodied in the legislative history,'7 are diametrically opposed to
the Court's allegedly obvious interpretation.'" In addition, most of the
courts that have interpreted the ADA on this issue, 9 and the dissenting
15. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2) (1999) (Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission stating that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard to mitigating measures ....");
28 C.F.R. pt. 35 app. A § 35.104 (1999) (Department of Justice stating that "[t]he question of
whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures ...."); 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (1999) (Department of Transportation: a disability is "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an
individual ....").
17. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(stating "[w]hether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of
mitigating measures ...."); H.R. REP. No. 101-485(1II), at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450-51 (stating "[t]he impairment should be assessed without considering
whether mitigating measures ... would result in a less-than-substantial limitation."); S. REP. No.
101-116, at 23 (1989) (stating "whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard
to the availability of mitigating measures .. "). See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
18. In fact, the agency interpretations and legislative history mandate an approach opposite to
that of the Court in regard to the analysis of mitigating measures in disability determinations. See
supra notes 16-17.
19. See Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a
determination of disabilities is made by evaluating the effect a person's impairment has on a major
life activity without considering mitigating measures); Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law
Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2388
(1999) (holding that disabilities must be determined without considering mitigating measures);
Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
serious impairments should be considered in unmitigated state), cert. granted and judgment vacated,
119 S. Ct. 2388 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626, 629-30 (7th Cir. 1998)
(evaluating a condition without regard to the effects of mitigating measures); Arnold v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859-66 (1 st Cir. 1998) (concluding that plaintiffs diabetes should
be considered without regard to whether his limitations were ameliorated through medication or
other treatment); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir.
1997) (using the ADA and legislative history to support the decision to avoid considering mitigating
measures when assessing disability); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 762-65 (6th Cir.
1997) (citing to the EEOC as a basis for deciding that mitigating measures will not be used for
disability determinations); Doane v. Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 627 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that
mitigating effects will not be considered when determining disability); Harris v. H & W Contracting
Co., 102 F.3d 516, 520-21 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that the use of mitigating measures shall be
considered on a case-by-case basis); Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362, 366 (9th Cir. 1996)
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Justices on the Supreme Court," did not interpret it in the way that the
Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg majorities did. A significant aspect of
this disparity may lie in the Court's presumption that there is an inherent
conflict between applying the individualized approach mandated by the
ADA and making disability determinations without regard to mitigating
measures.' This presumption by the Court is directly contradicted by the
interpretations of the agencies charged with implementing the Act and
the clear intent of Congress. Finally, as will be discussed in greater de-
tail below, in interpreting the Act this way the Court strays from several
generally accepted methods of statutory construction for civil rights stat-
utes, and may create confusion regarding deference to agency interpreta-
tions. -3
The Court's approach seems to focus on supporting a particular re-
sult, especially given the factually appealing scenarios the Court chose to
hear. Unfortunately, the holdings, aside from perhaps Kirkingburg, are
quite broad and could apply to many situations where the facts are not as
appealing.' This Article will focus on the trio of cases, and some of the
concerns they raise under the ADA and in regard to judicial interpreta-
tion. It is essential to note that this Article is not an exhaustive discussion
of the ADA, its history, or its social context. Rather, it points out the
deep concerns regarding the contradictions raised by the questionable
and decontextualized approach applied in the majority opinions in Sut-
ton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg.
Part I of this Article provides a review of the Sutton, Murphy, and
Kirkingburg decisions. Part II addresses the connections and conflicts
between the Court's interpretation of the definition of "disability" and
the legislative history of the ADA, agency interpretations, and prior
cases. Part II also discusses the same conflicts concerning the Court's
interpretation of the ADA's "regarded as" having a disability provision.
Part III examines the Court's novel statutory construction in the trio of
cases and compares it with generally applicable methods of statutory
construction. Part III also analyzes the Court's approach in light of its
previous decisions regarding deference to administrative agency inter-
pretations. Parts II and III demonstrate the apparently result/policy-
oriented nature of the Court's approach. Finally, Part IV explores the
(stating that EEOC regulations dictate that mitigating measures are not to be considered when
determining disability).
20. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 2161 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
21. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
22. See supra notes 16-17. See also Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. These issues are discussed infra Part 111.
24. While the Court suggests flexibility in dicta, the holdings are rather broad. See, e.g.,
Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149. The mitigating measures holding, combined with the other aspects of the
Court's interpretation of the term "disability," will exclude many individuals who would have
previously been considered disabled under the disability determination threshold.
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options remaining for individuals who are no longer "disabled" under the
Court's approach in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg.
I. THE CASES
This Part contains a brief overview of the Sutton, Murphy and
Kirkingburg cases. A more thorough discussion of the issues and con-
cerns raised by those cases is contained in Parts H, HI, and IV. The pur-
pose of this Section is to provide some context for the later parts of this
Article by giving a synopsis of the majority opinion in each of the three
cases, as well as introducing the apparent contradictions contained within
each decision.
A. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
Of the three ADA cases decided on June 22, 1999, Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc.25 may be the most significant because the other two cases
rely heavily on it.26 In Sutton, the majority decided that courts must con-
sider corrective and mitigating measures in disability determinations
under the ADA.27 In doing so, it disregarded the holdings of the majority
of circuits that have considered the issue,28 the long-standing interpreta-
tions of the three administrative agencies charged with implementing the
ADA, 9 and the bulk of the legislative history readily available (including
specific language in both the House and Senate Committee Reports
which clearly contradict the Court's findings). ° The Court also held that
the petitioners in Sutton could not support their claim that the respondent
airline "regarded" them as disabled in violation of the ADA.31 As will be
discussed below, the holding on the "regarded as" claim may have far-
ther-reaching ramifications well beyond this set of facts.
25. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. 2139.
26. See Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137 (1999); Albertsons, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999).
27. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
28. See, e.g., Bartlett v. New York State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 156 F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir.
1998) (holding that self-accommodations cannot be considered when determining a disability), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 119 S. Ct. 2399 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d
626, 629-30 (7th Cit. 1998) (holding that disabilities should be determined without reference to
mitigating measures); Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that
plaintiff's diabetes should be considered without regard to whether his limitations were ameliorated
through medication or other treatment); Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d
933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997) (using the EEOC Interpretative Guidance to decide that mitigating
measures will not be considered).
29. See supra note 16 and accompanying text; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2155-56 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
30. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
31. Sutton, at 2149-52.
[Vol. 77:1
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The petitioners in Sutton were twin sisters who applied to United Air
Lines for positions as global pilots. 2 Their applications were terminated
when the airline realized they each had severe myopia resulting in uncor-
rected visual acuity of 20/200 or worse.33 Although they both functioned
identically to individuals when wearing their prescription glasses, they
did not meet the airline's minimum requirement of 20/100-uncorrected
visual acuity.' Petitioners filed suit under the ADA, alleging that they
were disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A), which defines "disability"
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
... major life activities."35 Petitioners further alleged that the respondent
airline impermissibly "regarded" them as disabled under 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(C) because the airline found them unable to satisfy the re-
quirements of the job of global pilot even though their impairments were
controlled with corrective devices.36
The Court essentially used the disability claim in Sutton to redefine a
major aspect of the definition of "disability" under the Act.37 According
to the reasoning in Sutton, in making disability determinations courts
must examine claims in light of any corrective or mitigating measures."
The Court based this aspect of its holding on three grounds. First, the
Court noted that "the phrase 'substantially limits"' in the definition of
disability is in the present indicative verb form.'3 The Court concluded
therefore that the language thus requires a person to be presently sub-
stantially limited in a major life activity, and that it is inappropriate to
determine substantial limitation in regard to whether an impairment
"'might,' 'could,' or 'would' be substantially limiting if mitigating
measures were not taken."' According to the Court, "[a] person whose
physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or other meas-
ures does not have an impairment that presently 'substantially limits' a
major life activity."'
Second, the Sutton Court determined that the definition of "disabil-
ity" requires courts to make disability determinations on an individual-
ized basis. 2 Consequently, the Court concluded that making disability
determinations based on an individual's level of impairment in an "un-
corrected or unmitigated state runs directly counter to the individualized
32. Seeid. at 2143.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Id. at 2143-44.
36. Id.
37.. Id. at 2146-47.
38. See id. at 2146.
39. ld. at 2146.
40. Id. at 2146-47.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 2147 (citing Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998); 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j) (1998)).
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inquiry mandated by the ADA."43 As a corollary to the Court's view of
the individualized analysis, the Court pointed out that in making disabil-
ity determinations based on an individual's impairment in an unmitigated
state "courts and employers could not consider any negative side effects.
• . resulting from the use of mitigating measures."" The Court presuma-
bly believes that this new interpretation will be beneficial to the individ-
ual who will now be judged in her corrected state.
Finally, the Court found that because congressional findings "en-
acted as part of the ADA" refer to "some 43,000,000 Americans" having
one or more disabilities, Congress could not have intended the Act to
require disability determinations to be made in regard to an individual's
unmitigated state, because that would result in a number far greater than
the 43,000,000 figure stated in the congressional findings.45 The Court
essentially ignored the legislative history directly relevant to the mitiga-
tion issue.46
As will be explained in Parts II and III of this Article, each of these
points is specious, and is directly contradicted by agency interpretations,
legislative history, and numerous lower court interpretations. Ironically,
the Court used these same arguments to hold that the Act is clear on its
face, and that it is thus unnecessary to examine the legislative history or
follow the agency interpretations.4 ' This is circular reasoning. The Court
made numerous presumptions to support a disputed position it says is
clear, and then used that alleged clarity to avoid referring to otherwise
important sources that universally contradict the Court's presumptions4.
Next, the Court applied its new approach to disability determinations
to the life activity of working.49 Petitioners in Sutton based their claim on
the major life activity of working, rather than that of seeing." Basing
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2147-49.
46. See id. at 2154-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. See id. at 2146-49.
48. Justice Stevens' dissent powerfully drives home the discontinuity between the Court's
conclusion and the numerous sources that canons of statutory construction suggest should be
considered in this case, such as legislative history and agency interpretations. Id. at 2152-61
(Stevens, J., dissenting). See also infra Part ILI.A (addressing the issues of statutory construction and
deference to administrative agency guidelines in greater depth).
49. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150-52. As will be seen, working is generally considered the "weak
link" in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") definitions of life activities.
50. See id. at 2150. Petitioners originally claimed a disability under the major life activity of
seeing. The District Court held that while petitioners were impaired, the impairment did not substan-
tially limit them in the life activity of seeing. The court stated that petitioners did not actually claim
any other restrictions for the life activity of seeing other than the ability to obtain the positions
sought, although the court does cite petitioners' allegations that they are impaired in everyday ac-
tivities such as driving, etc. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., CIV.A.96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *3
(D. Colo. Aug. 28, 1996).
The Tenth Circuit agreed that petitioners are impaired, but held that under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
of the ADA, whether such impairment rises to the level of a disability depends on whether
[Vol. 77:1
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their claim on work limited the possibility of relief under the ADA be-
cause the EEOC guidelines themselves suggest that claimants resort to
this activity only as a last resort, where no other viable claim exists." The
Court appeared to latch onto this point to further limit the availability of
a disability claim under subsection (A), at least where the claim is made
under the "life activity" of working. 2 The Court took advantage of the
lower courts' dismissal of petitioners' claimed disability in the major life
activity of seeing to avoid any in-depth analysis on this point. 3 The result
might have been different had the Court analyzed this argument, but Pe-
titioners' visual condition was still controlled with the use of correc-
tive/mitigating measures. Thus, adopting the Court's reasoning, the peti-
tioners would not likely have prevailed under subsection (A) even under
the major life activity of seeing because the condition was mitigated. The
Court's approach diminishes the chances of being found disabled under
subsection (A) when one has a disorder that responds well to corrective
devices, no matter what "life activity" would be affected but for the miti-
gating measure. The Court clearly implies this in its analysis of the indi-
vidualized nature of disability determinations.'
The best potential recourse left if a "controlled" disability is no
longer covered, would be to claim a violation of subsection (C), where
the employer must erroneously "regard" the individual as disabled or
regard the individual as still disabled despite the controlling measure.
The Court limited claims under subsection (C) that are based on the life
activity of "working" by holding that such claims must now be even
more specifically drawn to show that the individual is substantially lim-
ited to "a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes" (and
ironically used the EEOC guidelines for support)." From now on, the
applicant/worker will theoretically need to show an employer's unwill-
ingness to hire him/her to perform any positions the employer may have,
even one which may be below the abilities and/or training of the appli-
cant. 6 A trained secretary with a controlled disability might be denied a
petitioners are substantially limited in light of mitigating or corrective measures. Sutton v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 900 (10th Cir. 1997). The court held that petitioners' corrected vision
did not limit them in the life activity of seeing, and rejected as an incorrect interpretation petitioners'
reliance on the definition of "legal blindness" for purposes of Social Security disability benefits,
holding that that definition contemplates corrected vision. Id. at 900-10. Yet the Supreme Court
stated petitioners do not make the "obvious argument" that they are regarded as having a substantial
limitation in the life activity of seeing, only that they are regarded as having a substantial limitation
in the life activity of working. Sutton, at 2150.
51. Sutton, at 2150-51.
52. Id. at 2149-50.
53. Id. at 2150.
54. Seeid. at 2147.
55. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-51.
56. As will be seen in Part II this might give employers a way to thwart claims under
subsection (C) regardless of the major life activity involved, because the employer can simply claim:
"We did not regard plaintiff as impaired in major life activity X, but rather we only considered her
impaired as to her specific job."
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position based on the employer's "regarding" her as still disabled in
some way for that job, but if the employer believes she could perform a
filing clerk's position it would seem the applicant might not be able to
show discrimination under subsection (C). 7
The Court did not even address whether the employer actually needs
to offer another position. The Court based its opinion in great part on the
fact that petitioners would meet respondent airline's visual test for other,
non-global, pilot positions, but made no mention of whether an employer
must offer another position.58 Indeed, in another example of the Court's
murkiness, on the issues, the Court declined to address whether United
Air Lines acuity requirements for global pilots, which differ from those
for other commercial pilots, has any relevance to the position and there-
fore to the airline's refusal to hire petitioners. As with the other two
cases, the Supreme Court might have upheld the lower court's holding in
Sutton on the basis that the petitioners were not qualified for the position
even with corrective measures, assuming United Air Lines could justify
those requirements. The Court, however, never reached this issue.
As noted above, the Court held that whether a person is disabled is
an individualized inquiry, which includes consideration of the positive or
negative effects on the individual from the measures used to control the
disability." At first blush this would seem a logical, perhaps even be-
nevolent, interpretation of the Act. However, the Court applies this rea-
soning, in all three cases, in a manner which would appear to penalize
individuals who are able to control their disabilities at least to some ex-
tent, but who may be subject to unfounded stereotypes or need workplace
accommodation to effectuate total, or even further, control. The Court, in
trying to explain its position, uses a form of reasoning that ranges from
unclear to outright confusing, and seldom comes close to legitimizing its
holding.
For example, in its analysis of the individualized nature of disability
determinations, the Court states the following:
For instance, under [the view that disability determinations should be
made based on an individual's unmitigated state], courts would al-
most certainly find all diabetics to be disabled, because if they failed
to monitor their blood sugar levels and administer insulin, they would
almost certainly be substantially limited in one or more major life ac-
tivities. A diabetic whose illness does not impair his or her daily ac-
tivities would therefore be considered disabled simply because he or
she has diabetes. Thus, the guidelines approach would create a system
in which persons often must be treated as members of a group of peo-
57. Id.at2151.
58. See id. at 2150-51.
59. See id. at 2146-47.
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pie with similar impairments, rather than as individuals. This is con-
trary to both the letter and the spirit of the ADA.60
Prior to Sutton, in most jurisdictions, a diabetic would have met the defi-
nition of disabled; the level of control was used to determine whether she
was a "qualified individual with a disability." Thus, poorly and well-
controlled individuals alike were protected from stereotype-based dis-
crimination. The Court's approach, however, essentially disadvantages
the well-controlled individual by removing her from coverage, even if an
employer discriminates based on unfounded perceptions or generaliza-
tions about the disability, and through its analysis of the "regarded as"
clause the Court also limited the situations in which subsection (C) will
be an effective alternative.6' The broader implications of this will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Part II of this Article.
First though, let us consider another all too plausible application of the
Court's decision here, this time based on an application of subsection (C):
Jason suffers from a moderate form of schizophrenia. He responds
well to medication, and has held a number of low-level clerking posi-
tions, receiving positive references. He applied for the position of cus-
tomer service representative in a propane gas company, which pays an
advertised rate of $8/hour. The position would require Jason to deal with
both new and present customers in person at the service counter as they
come in to apply for service or inquire about problems with their ac-
counts. Jason would be responsible for taking the correct information
from them, informing them of the company's services and policies, and
referring any problems to the appropriate company personnel. The job
description corresponds to those duties Jason has successfully fulfilled in
the past.
The hiring manager is aware of Jason's condition, and she is con-
cerned that Jason will not be able to handle the pressure of the service
counter, which can become extremely busy during the winter months,
with customers frequently angry over service problems. She offers Jason
a position in the stock room instead, which pays minimum wage.
Before Sutton, Jason would likely have been able to bring a claim
showing: 1) that he is disabled under the ADA, because he has a disabil-
ity which substantially limits one or more life activities, including, but
not necessarily limited to, that of working; and, 2) that the potential em-
ployer "regards" him as disabled despite the fact that he can show a work
history which supports his ability to do the customer service job. Now,
however, it is questionable whether he could do either. Under subsection
(A), if his schizophrenia is controlled by medication, it is unlikely that a
court would find him substantially limited in a major life activity at this
60. Id. at 2147.
61. Id. at 2158-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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time.62 He may also be unable to show discrimination based on subsection
(C) because the employer found he could do another job in the "broad
range" of the employer's jobs, albeit at a lower level of responsibility
and pay. Although Jason has been precluded from a position based on
nothing more than his disability, the Court's decision in Sutton and its
progeny could well leave him without recourse. This is an all too likely
result of the Court's murky approach.
When you add to the mix the Court's justifications for disregarding
settled administrative law, and the legislative history relevant here, one
has to wonder whether Sutton will prove to be the Lopez" of administra-
tive law, with the lower courts left never quite sure how, when, or if,
Sutton applies. Whether the Court will acknowledge this and seek to
clarify its holding--or whether Congress will do it for them-remains to
be seen. The ramifications for administrative law will be discussed in
Part III of this article.
B. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
In Murphy, the Court held that a mechanic with chronic and severe
hypertension whose job required him to drive commercial vehicles was
neither disabled nor "regarded as" disabled under the ADA.' The me-
chanic erroneously received Department of Transportation ("DOT")
health certification although he did not meet the requirements for those
who drive commercial vehicles. 5 In the time between the erroneous grant
of certification and the discovery that he did not meet the certification
requirements, Murphy apparently performed his job without incident.'
Upon discovering the error, however, United Parcel Service, Inc.
("UPS") terminated Murphy's employment because he did not meet the
DOT requirements. 7 The Court primarily relied upon the reasoning from
Sutton in holding that Murphy was not disabled for ADA purposes, but
expanded on the Sutton reasoning in addressing the "regarded as" dis-
abled issue 8
Significantly, the case could have been decided on the "qualified in-
dividual with a disability" issue, particularly in light of the contempora-
62. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146-47.
63. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (effectively reversing a half-century long trend of
giving great deference to Congress in Commerce Clause cases by holding that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause authority). Just as Lopez reversed a half-century
long trend of giving great deference to Congress on Commerce Clause cases, Sutton effectively
overturns years of precedent giving deference to administrative agency decisions-without actually
saying so. We are left to wonder how the lower courts will deal with this implicit change.




68. Id. at 2137-38; See supra Part I.A. (summarizing the Sutton opinion).
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neous decision in Kirkingburg,69 but the Court eliminated Murphy's
claim at the threshold issue of whether he was covered by the ADA at
all. The reasoning used to reach this result involved presumptions and
inconsistencies in logic that will be discussed in greater depth in Parts II
and III. The remainder of this subsection will simply provide an over-
view of the decision in Murphy.
In finding that Mr. Murphy was not disabled for ADA purposes, the
Court explained that the holding in Sutton resolved the issue because
"when medicated, petitioner's high blood pressure does not substantially
limit him in any major life activity."'7 Thus, as the Court did in Sutton,
the Murphy Court seemingly eliminated an entire class of individuals
from ADA protection without ever reaching the question of whether such
individuals are "qualified individuals with disabilities" or whether they
need reasonable accommodation.7 While this might be less troubling to
some given the facts in Murphy, which involved DOT certification re-
quirements, the holding is not so limited.72
Still, there is one significant limitation in the decision:
Because the question whether petitioner is disabled when taking
medication is not before us, we have no occasion here to consider
whether petitioner is "disabled" due to limitations that persist despite
his medication. Instead, the question granted was limited to whether,
under the ADA, the determination of whether an individual's im-
pairment "substantially limits" one or more major life activities
should be made without consideration of mitigating measures."
As will be discussed later in this Article, when considered in light of
aspects of the Court's holding in Bragdon v. Abbott," this language could
bring more individuals within the definition of "disability" under the
ADA.
Given the holding in Sutton, however, many individuals with treat-
able and well-controlled chronic hypertension, epilepsy, diabetes, myo-
pia, and other conditions, would not be covered under the ADA as a
threshold matter. Thus, this limiting language from Murphy would not be
helpful to Michele in the example above until the lights (and the failure
to provide accommodation) actually caused her to have a seizure.
Moreover, that language would not be helpful to an individual with such
well-mitigated conditions even where an employer acts on inaccurate
69. See infra Part I.C. (summarizing the Kirkingburg opinion).
70. Id.
71. Compare Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2143 (holding that courts should make disability
determinations with reference to mitigating measures) with Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2136 (explaining
that, with medication, petitioner is not substantially limited in one or more major life activities).
72. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
73. Id. at 2137.
74. 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
75. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
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stereotypes regarding a disability, because such individuals are no longer
considered disabled, and thus can not challenge discriminatory conduct
unless they can support a claim that the employer "regarded" them as
disabled or discriminated based on a record of disability. This is where
Murphy becomes especially problematic, because it also limits the op-
portunity for individuals like Mr. Murphy and Michele to prove they are
"regarded as" disabled by their employers, and thus limits the best alter-
native means for gaining coverage under the ADA.76
In addressing the "regarded as" issue, the Murphy Court again relied
on the reasoning from Sutton. Significantly, as did the petitioners in Sut-
ton, Mr. Murphy alleged that working was the major life activity in
which he was limited." The Court held that in order to meet the "re-
garded as" element in an ADA claim, an employee must show that her
employer regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity.6 If an employee alleges that an employer "regarded"
her as substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the em-
ployee must demonstrate that she was regarded as "being precluded from
more than one job."79 The Court assumed, without holding, "that the
EEOC regulations regarding a disability determination are valid.""° Those
guidelines (which were also a significant focus in Sutton) state that to be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, an employee
must be "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of
jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the aver-
age person having comparable training, skills and abilities."6 In addition,
the Murphy majority states that courts should consider "the number and
types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,
within the geographical area reasonably accessible to the individual,
from which the individual is also disqualified.1
8
2
Applying this definition to Mr. Murphy's claim, the Supreme Court
held that UPS simply regarded Mr. Murphy as "unable to meet the DOT
regulations," and thus as precluded only from his particular job because
he was able to perform other jobs that did not require him to drive com-
mercial vehicles.83 Thus, according to the Court, UPS did not preclude
Mr. Murphy from working in a "class of jobs"; a requirement that a
plaintiff must meet in order to establish that he or she is substantially
limited in the major life activity of working.' This was fatal to Mr. Mur-
phy's "regarded as" claim, as it was to the claims in Sutton. Still, as in
76. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2137.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2138; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151.
80. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138.
81. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998)).
82. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B) (1998)).
83. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
84. Id. at 2139.
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Sutton, the Court only considered the major life activity of working.
Therefore, it remains to be seen how the Court's approach would apply
to a claim where another life activity is at issue. There are, however, two
significant points to be made in this regard.
First, while the Court has only considered the major life activity of
working, and has acknowledged the unique hurdles a complainant must
overcome to demonstrate an impairment in regard to that major life ac-
tivity, its holdings in Sutton and Murphy have ramifications for all claims
based on the "regarded as" element (as well as claims based on the dis-
ability element). This is because in analyzing the "regarded as" claims in
those cases, the Court required the complainant to demonstrate that the
employer regarded him or her as substantially impaired in a specific
major life activity or activities." Thus, an employer who does not under-
stand a given impairment well enough to know what life activities might
be affected, or an employer with an aversion or animus toward those
with an impairment, could discriminate without "regarding" an employee
or applicant as substantially limited in any major life activity other than
working at the particular job the individual seeks or holds. As a result,
unless an employer regards an employee's impairment as substantially lim-
iting in regard to a specific life activity or activities, the employer can dis-
criminate based merely on the perception that the employee cannot perform
a particular job. That is exactly what occurred in Sutton and Murphy."
Second, the Court's focus on working might actually limit its hold-
ing, and provide a means by which some employees with impairments
that substantially limit another major life activity, but who are not so
impaired with mitigating measures, can successfully bring a claim when
their employers treat them as though they are so impaired. As noted
above, the Sutton Court hinted that it might have responded differently to
a claim based on the major life activity of seeing. 7 This possibility will
be discussed in greater depth in Parts II and IV of this Article. As also
discussed in those Parts, the Sutton plaintiffs would probably have lost at
the next level of inquiry-whether they were qualified individuals with
disabilities. That is the appropriate issue on which to consider these
cases, but the Court eliminated the claims at the threshold issue of
whether petitioners were covered under the ADA. For individuals like
Michele, Jason, and Mr. Murphy, this approach could make it exceed-
ingly hard to ever get to the discrimination issue.
C. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
Kirkingburg involved an employee who lost his job as a truck driver
for Albertsons, Inc. because his visual acuity did not meet DOT require-
85. Id. at 2137; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
86. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. at 2139; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151-52.
87. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2150.
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ments.9 He suffered from a condition called amblyopia that resulted in
20/200 vision in his left eye, which effectively left him with monocular
vision." Significantly, the DOT had implemented a waiver program, and
Mr. Kirkingburg ultimately received a waiver. Albertsons nevertheless
refused to rehire him because the waiver program was experimental and
Kirkingburg did not meet the basic DOT vision requirements absent the
waiver.'
The Court applied the reasoning from Sutton, and held that Mr.
Kirkingburg was not disabled under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)9 because
he was not substantially limited in a major life activity given his innate
ability to compensate for the poor vision in his impaired eye through
natural adjustments.92 The majority reinforced the Sutton holding that
courts should make disability determinations under the ADA on an indi-
vidualized basis in light of any mitigating measures. 3 In determining that
Mr. Kirkingburg was not disabled, the Court held that whether a miti-
gating measure is artificial, such as medication or prosthetics, or natu-
rally created, "consciously or not, with the body's own systems," is ir-
relevant to the importance of the mitigating measure in the disability
determination.94
Another significant aspect of the case arose from the definition of
"significantly restricts" in the EEOC interpretation of the substantial
limitation element of claims of disability under 42 U.S.C. §
12102(2)(A)." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that Mr.
Kirkingburg's impairment substantially limited him in regard to the ma-
jor life activity of seeing, because Mr. Kirkingburg "demonstrated that
'the manner in which he sees differs significantly from the manner in
which most people see.' "" The Supreme Court held, however, that this
was an improper interpretation of the substantial limitation element as
defined in the EEOC regulation relied upon by the Ninth Circuit.97
The EEOC regulation defines "substantially limits" to require an im-
pairment to significantly restrict the manner in which an individual can
perform a major life activity as compared to the manner in "which the
average person in the general population can perform that same major
life activity."9 The Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in equating
88. Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2165-66 (1999).
89. Id. at 2164-66 (describing Mr. Kirkingburg's "monocular vision" as "an uncorrectable
condition that leaves him with 20/200 vision in his left eye").
90. Id. at 2166.
91. Id. at 2168-69.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2169.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 2168.
96. Id. at 2167 (quoting Kirkingburg v. Albertsons, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 1998)).
97. Id. at 2168.
98. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(ii) (1998).
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"significant difference" with "significant restriction," because doing so
improperly limited the ADA's "requirement that only impairments
causing 'substantial limitations' in individuals' ability to perform major
life activities constitute disabilities."99 Thus, as interpreted by the Court, a
significant difference between the way an impaired individual can per-
form a major life activity and the way most people can perform the same
activity is not sufficient to establish a substantial limitation in that major
life activity."
The Court also held that the Ninth Circuit erred in not assessing Mr.
Kirkingburg's disability on an individualized basis as outlined in the
holding in Sutton.'"' Nevertheless, the Kirkingburg Court is arguably
more generous in its interpretation of this issue. The Court stated: "While
some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation of a
major life activity we cannot say monocularity does."'' 2 Although only
dicta, this statement implies a less rigid approach concerning some im-
pairments which might be considered virtually per se disabilities. Given
Justice O'Connor's opinions for the Court in Sutton and Murphy, how-
ever, it remains to be seen if this possible flexibility suggested in Justice
Souter's opinion for the Kirkingburg Court will come to fruition. Still,
almost immediately following this language, the opinion suggests that
many monocular individuals will meet the definition of disability so long
as they can prove that their impairment is substantially limiting.'°3 Fur-
ther, the Court suggests that people with monocular vision will "ordinar-
ily" be considered disabled.'"
This could prove significant because the Sutton and Murphy Courts
addressed only the major life activity of working. This language implies
that it may be substantially easier to satisfy the Court's new approach to
disability determinations when a life activity other than working is al-
leged. Of course, even then, if mitigating measures make the impairment
less than substantially limiting, as in Michele's case, this language adds
nothing. If this language were applied to claims based on being "re-
garded as" disabled, an issue not before the Court in Kirkingburg,"'5 it
might be even more significant. As for Mr. Kirkingburg, the Court held
he did not make the proper showing that the impairment was substan-
tially limiting in his case.'"4
Ironically, the main issue in Kirkingburg was not whether Mr. Kirk-
ingburg was disabled, but whether he was a "qualified individual with a
99. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2168.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 2169.
102. Id. (citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2167 n.9.
106. Id. at 2169.
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disability," because he did not meet the DOT requirements.107 It is quite
interesting, in light of the treatment of the agency regulations in Sutton
and Murphy, that the Court in Kirkingburg is quite deferential to the
DOT regulations.' 8 Nonetheless, there is nothing new or surprising about
the holding that when an individual does not meet government safety
requirements for a specific job, that individual is not qualified for the job.
If, for example, the DOT required uncorrected visual acuity of at
least 20/100 in each eye for commercial drivers with no exceptions, any-
one who did not meet that requirement would not be qualified to be a
commercial driver. The employer could not accommodate the em-
ployee/applicant, because even if the employer believed there to be a safe
accommodation, the employer would still be in violation of the govern-
ment regulation by allowing the person to drive a commercial vehicle."8
The DOT waiver program made Kirkingburg a tougher case.
The Court held that the employer need not hire a driver based on the
fact that he or she could receive a waiver under the DOT's new program.
It reasoned that the employer was entitled to rely on the clear mandate of
the safety regulation, regardless of the availability of a waiver under an
explicitly experimental program."' The waiver program, the Court stated,
"did not rest on any final, factual conclusion that the waiver scheme
would be conducive to public safety" to the same extent as the general
visual acuity standards in the DOT regulation."' Nor did the waiver pro-
gram modify the substance of the regulation; rather it "was simply an
experiment with safety ... whose confirmation or refutation in practice
would provide a factual basis for reconsidering the existing standards.""'2
Thus, it would be inappropriate to force Albertsons to hire Mr. Kirking-
burg simply because he received an experimental waiver of an otherwise
binding safety regulation.'
This aspect of the case is less problematic for purposes of this Article
because it is factually limited to cases involving government safety
regulations."' Moreover, as will be discussed in Part II of this Article, by
addressing whether an employee or applicant is a "qualified individual
with a disability," the Court is addressing the appropriate issues at the
appropriate stage of the ADA analysis. It was in analyzing the threshold
disability determination that the Kirkingburg Court, as well as the Sutton
and Murphy Courts, erred by coming to a conclusion contrary to the leg-
107. Id. at 2169-70.
108. Id. at 2169-70 n. 13; see infra Part lIl.
109. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
110. Id. at 2171-74.
Ill. Id. at2173.
112. Id. at 2174.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 2070-74.
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islative intent of the ADA," the interpretations of the agencies charged
with implementing the Act, and most of the courts that have analyzed the
issue."6
H. LET'S PRETEND: AN INTERPRETIVE MORASS
As the brief overview in Part I suggests, the three cases exhibit an
almost surreal disregard for the legislative history, agency interpreta-
tions, and context of the ADA. Justice Stevens' dissent in Sutton does an
excellent job of pointing this out. ' 7 Many of those involved in the proc-
ess of drafting, passing, interpreting, and enforcing the language in the
ADA came to the exact opposite conclusion from that of the Court.
Given that fact, the authors of this Article were somewhat stunned by the
Court's holding that "by its terms, the ADA cannot be read" to allow
courts to ignore mitigating measures in making their disability determi-
nations; thereby implying that the "plain meaning" of the Act dictated
the outcomes in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg."' It would seem that
what was "plain" to the Court was not so evident to the members of
Congress who passed the ADA, the agencies charged by Congress to
implement it, and most of the courts to consider the issue.
A. Defining "Disability" Under the ADA
The first point of concern arising from the Sutton, Murphy, and
Kirkingburg cases arises from the definition of "disability" in the ADA.
Specifically, it stems from whether courts should make disability deter-
minations with or without regard to mitigating measures such as medica-
tions and medical devices. As the above hypotheticals involving Michele
and Jason demonstrate, the answer to this question can have significant
ramifications for both employers and employees.
The ADA defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being re-
garded as having such an impairment.""' 9 The focus in this section will be
on part (A) of the definition. As explained above, the Court held that in
making disability determinations courts should consider the effects of
any mitigating measures on the individual's impairment.'2" In Sutton, the
Court essentially held that the plain meaning of the statutory language
115. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
117. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, the dissenting opinions of
Justices Stevens and Breyer raise several of the concerns discussed in this Article. Id.; Id. at 2161-62
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 2146-47.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
120. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145-46; Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2137
(1999); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2169 (1999).
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supported this result."' As noted in Part I.A. of this Article, there were
three primary bases for this conclusion: 1) the grammatical form of the
phrase "substantially limits" requires that an impairment "presently"
substantially limit an individual; 2) the statutory language refers to "indi-
viduals with disabilities," rather than undifferentiated disability catego-
ries; and, 3) legislative findings in the Act refer to 43,000,000 individuals
with disabilities, yet if all persons impaired in a major life activity in
their un-medicated state were included, a dramatically larger number of
people would be within the Act's purview.'22 Ironically, the Court, which
dismisses the need to explore the legislative history regarding the miti-
gating measures issue because of the supposed clarity of the statutory
text, uses the legislative history to support its third basis for finding that
text to be so clear.
23
If, as the Court suggests, these three bases really do mean that "by its
terms, the ADA cannot be read" to allow courts to make disability de-
terminations without regard to mitigating measures,'24 the Court's conclu-
sions on this issue would seem correct, perhaps even inescapable. Thus, a
closer examination of the Court's bases for this conclusion is essential to
determining whether the Act's language really does mandate the conclu-
sion the Court reaches. When examined, each of the Court's bases proves
tenuous or specious. It is not that the Court's reasoning is not plausible
under some reading of the Act, but that the Court's reading is not the
only, or even the best, reading of the Act.
As will be discussed further in Part III of this Article, under such cir-
cumstances the Court ordinarily looks beyond the text of the statute, to
sources that may clarify the meaning of the statutory language.'" How-
ever, in this case the Court cannot afford to do that because such sources
confirm that the Court's interpretation of the statutory language is
weak. 26 Thus, by pretending the statutory language mandates its conclu-
sion, and does not permit the alternative, the Court is able to avoid con-
sidering equally plausible alternative interpretations.
1) The Present Indicative Verb Form
The first basis for the Court's conclusion-that the grammatical form
of the definition of disability requires that an impairment "presently"
substantially limit an individual, and thus mandates consideration of
mitigating measures-is not the most logical reading of the Act espe-
cially when its purpose, structure, and legislative history are
121. Sutton, 119S. Ct. at2146.
122. Id. at 2146-49.
123. Id. at 2149.
124. Id. at 2146.
125. See infra notes 214-18 and accompanying text.
126. See generally supra notes 16-20; Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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considered.'27 The statutory language the Court relies upon here comes
from 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A), which defines a disability as "a physical
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of [an] individual."'28 Based on this definition, the Court
holds that:
Because the phrase "substantially limits" appears in the Act in the
present indicative verb form, we think the language is properly read
as requiring that a person be presently-not potentially or hypotheti-
cally-substantially limited in order to demonstrate a disability. A
"disability" exists only where an impairment "substantially limits" a
major life activity, not where it "might," "could," or "would" be sub-
stantially limiting if mitigating measures were not taken. A person
whose physical or mental impairment is corrected by medication or
other measures does not have an impairment that presently "substan-
tially limits" a major life activity. 29
Yet there is no inconsistency between the statutory definition of dis-
ability and the making of disability determinations without regard to
mitigating measures. The fact that Congress used the term "substantially
limits" in the statute, rather than another form such as "substantially lim-
ited," does not support the Court's interpretation any more than it sup-
ports the opposite interpretation. A basic grammatical analysis demon-
strates this. Both of the following would seem perfectly appropriate: 1) a
disability is "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the major life activities" of an individual despite the use
of mitigating measures (essentially the Court's view); 2) a disability is "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities" of an individual without regard to mitigating
measures (essentially the view expressed in the legislative history and
administrative agency interpretations).
The use of the present indicative verb form says nothing about
whether courts should consider the individual in a mitigated or unmiti-
gated state. The implication of the Court's interpretation is that the verb
form implies determinations should be made in regard to an individual's
present condition, and therefore must refer to the mitigated state.' 3° While
even this presumption seems highly questionable as a structural matter, it
still does not support the Court's conclusion. An individual's disability
could "presently" be evaluated in regard to his or her unmitigated state
(in many instances a doctor could easily assess the person's condition in
an unmitigated state and, in many cases, readily available medical infor-
mation would make such an assessment obvious even to an untrained
observer). After all, as the term would suggest, "mitigation" of the un-
127. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994); See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
129. Sutton, 119S. Ct. at2146.
130. Id.
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derlying condition (as opposed to curing) means that the underlying con-
dition still exists in a clinical state. The Court presumes that requiring an
analysis of whether the person "might," "could," or "would," be disabled
in an unmitigated state necessitates a hypothetical analysis that is incon-
sistent with the definition. 3 ' As the two grammatical examples above
demonstrate the Court is hanging a heavy presumption on a very thin
thread.
Moreover, the Court's interpretation goes against an obvious struc-
tural interpretation based on the definition of "disability" as a whole.
Subsection (B) of the definition specifically covers those who have a
"record of ... an impairment" that substantially limits a major life activ-
ity or activities.'3 2 This is a specific acknowledgment that those whose
impairment is not a "present" impairment, are covered by the Act.' Jus-
tice Stevens wrote in his dissent in Sutton:
Subsection (B) of the definition, in fact, sheds a revelatory light on
the question whether Congress was concerned only about the cor-
rected or mitigated status of a person's impairment. If the Court is
correct that "[a] 'disability' exists only where" a person's "present"
or "actual" condition is substantially impaired, there would be no rea-
son to include in the protected class those who were once disabled but
who are now fully recovered. Subsection (B) of the Act's definition,
however, plainly covers a person who previously had a serious hear-
ing impairment that has been completely cured. Still, if I correctly
understand the Court's opinion, it holds that one who continues to
wear a hearing aid that she has worn all her life might not be cov-
ered-fully cured impairments are covered, but merely treatable ones
are not. The text of the Act surely does not require such a bizarre re-
sult.
The three prongs of the statute, rather, are most plausibly read to-
gether not to inquire into whether a person is currently "functionally"
limited in a major life activity, but only into the existence of an im-
pairment-present or past-that substantially limits, or did so limit,
the individual before amelioration. This reading avoids the counter-
intuitive conclusion that the ADA's safeguards vanish when indi-
viduals make themselves more employable by ascertaining ways to
overcome their physical or mental limitations.14
Moreover, subsection (B) of the definition uses the terminology "a rec-
ord of such an impairment." '35 The word "such" refers back to subsection
(A) and its present indicative verb form, despite the fact that subsection
(B) refers to past conditions (of course, the Court might respond that the
131. Id.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994); See Sutton at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
134. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
135. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994).
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record addressed in subsection (B) must by definition "presently"
exist). "6 Because the Court's interpretation is not the only possible inter-
pretation of the statutory language, the legislative history would be help-
ful in interpreting the term, and canons of statutory construction would
support looking at that history here.'37 Of course, such analysis would
suggest that the Court's interpretation is incorrect.
2) The Individualized Approach
The second basis for the Court's conclusion is quite important given
the ADA's individualized approach and concern about disability-based
stereotypes. There is a great deal of merit to the Court's approach of as-
sessing claims on an individualized basis. After all, no one should judge
disabled individuals based on presumed traits associated with their dis-
ability. For example, it would be wrong to treat a well-controlled diabetic
like a poorly controlled diabetic in most situations. Yet, as will be ex-
plained below, the Court's reasoning turns the purpose of this individu-
alized approach on its head by excluding from coverage well-controlled
individuals and others whose impairments can be mitigated.
Ironically, the structure and text of the Act make it unlikely that the
Court's approach is in keeping with the ADA, and the legislative history
confirms this." There is no question that the ADA requires consideration
of mitigating measures to determine whether an individual is a "qualified
individual with a disability," which is the next level of analysis in an
ADA claim.' To be "qualified" under Title I of the ADA, an individual
must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with or without
reasonable accommodation.' 0 At this level of analysis, mitigating meas-
ures such as medications and devices are clearly relevant because they go
to whether an individual can perform the essential functions of the job
and to what accommodation may be necessary, if any.'4 ' In fact, this is
the level of analysis where the Court's concept of the "individualized"
approach under the ADA is most relevant.'42
If, however, mitigating measures are considered in the initial dis-
ability determination the result is the removal from ADA coverage of
disabled individuals who are capable of performing the essential func-
tions of their jobs with little or no accommodation. Such individuals may
still be the victims of stereotyping and employment action based on such
136. id.
137. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-54 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
139. See42U.S.C.§ 12112 (1994).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994).
141. Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the use of a
hearing aid mitigated an impairment so that a person could perform essential job functions).
142. Justice Stevens suggests exactly this point in his Sutton dissent. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2156
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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stereotypes, evils Congress designed the Act to combat. 3 These indi-
viduals would thus be removed from coverage before they ever get a
chance to prove they were victims of discrimination. This is exactly the
consequence of the Sutton decision.'" Moreover, individuals like Mich-
ele, from the hypothetical above, who are not disabled under the Court's
definition, may need an accommodation to avoid problems related to
their disabilities. Yet, under the Court's approach they are not entitled to
accommodation because they is not disabled.'45
The Court presumed that an individualized assessment must be
made in light of any mitigating measures. The Court reasoned that in an
unmitigated state, the way one might respond to mitigating measures is
unknown.' 6 The Court also implied that many disabilities affect indi-
viduals identically in an unmitigated state; essentially bringing everyone
with a particular disability, regardless of the mitigated level of impair-
ment, within the Act's coverage.' 7 The legislative history and agency
interpretations seem to indicate this is exactly what Congress intended by
enacting the ADA.'8
Of course, this makes perfect sense because it is equally clear that
the analysis of whether someone is "qualified" will address the Court's
concerns. In fact, an individual whose impairment is completely miti-
gated is unlikely to ask for an accommodation, because she can perform
the essential functions of her job without accommodation. Consequently,
this individual will most likely raise ADA claims when subjected to dis-
parate treatment or a hostile work environment based on her disability
(or perceptions of that disability)."9 There is no question that one of the
purposes of the ADA is to prevent such stereotype based disparate treat-
ment,' ° but the Court's approach effectively removes from ADA cover-
age many of those intended to be protected from such conduct.'"' Even a
cursory examination of the legislative history and agency interpretations
demonstrates that the ADA is meant to protect individuals against dispa-
rate treatment even if their disabilities can be successfully and effectively
treated through mitigating measures, again rendering the Court's hold-
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (1994); Burgdorf, supra note 11 at 436, 452.
144. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2147.
147. Id.
148. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
149. Disparate treatment discrimination violates the ADA as it did the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)); 42 U.S.C. §
12112 (1994). Hostile work environment is also actionable under the ADA, but raises some unique
questions not raised under Title VII. See Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The
Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action For Workplace Harassment Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 15 CARDOZo L. REV. 1475, 1488-89 (1994).
150. 42U.S.C.§ 12101, 12112 (1994).
151. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
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ings unsupportable.'52 The alternative means of bringing such individuals
within the Act's protection, the "regarded as" disabled test, will be dis-
cussed in Parts ll.B. and IV below.
The majority opinions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg foster
this problem by relying on the supposed clarity of the statutory
language.'53 The claimed clarity enabled the Court to avoid analyzing and
applying the legislative history and agency regulations. As was pointed
out above, however, while it may be clear that courts must consider miti-
gating measures in regard to the "qualified" analysis, there is no basis to
presume that even under the individualized approach of the ADA courts
must consider such measures at the initial disability determination stage.
It is just as consistent to consider whether an employee/applicant is "dis-
abled" in her un-medicated state-and then to consider whether she is "a
qualified individual with a disability" based on his ability to perform the
job in a medicated state. In fact, this is far more consistent with the Act's
focus on remedying and preventing adverse employment decisions made
on the basis of stereotypes.'" It is hard to believe Congress intended the
ADA to preclude discrimination rooted in stereotypes that have evolved
based on the unmitigated characteristics of a given disability, and yet
excluded from coverage those subjected to job actions based on such
stereotypes if they are able to mitigate the impact of their impairment.
When, as the authors of this Article suggest is the case here, the
"plain language" of the statute does not "plainly" support an interpreta-
tion of that statute, courts, including the Supreme Court, often look to
agency interpretations and legislative history for guidance on how best to
interpret the law.'55 As Justice Stevens points out in his dissent in Sutton,
neither the agency interpretations nor the legislative history support the
Court's interpretation.'56 The EEOC, DOJ, and DOT-the three agencies
charged with implementing the Act-have each issued guidelines that
state that disability determinations are to be made without regard to miti-
gating measures.' 7 While agency guidelines do not bind the Court, they
are generally given a great deal of deference, even when only one
agency's interpretation is relevant to an issue. ' In fact, the Court specifi-
cally stated this general rule in Bragdon v. Abbott, a recent case involv-
ing the public accommodation provisions of the ADA.'
152. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
153. Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. 2162, 2174 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-50
(1999).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12101, 12112(1994).
155. See infra notes 207-18 and accompanying text.
156. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
158. See infra Part Ill (discussing deference to agency regulations).
159. Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
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The Court avoided this issue by holding that none of the three agen-
cies is "empowered" to interpret the "definition" provisions of the
ADA.'" The Court determined that Congress charged each agency only
with enforcing specific titles of the Act; none of which includes the pro-
vision defining "disability."' 6 ' Still, as Justice Breyer points out in his
Sutton dissent, the term "disability" is used frequently in each of the titles,
and thus the agency that interprets and enforces a specific title must be
able to define "disability."'62 As all three agencies agree on the mitigation
issue, their interpretations of this issue are, at a minimum, probative.'63
Significantly, the agency interpretations had great support in the
legislative history of the ADA. Both the House and Senate committee
reports reflect the fact that Congress intended courts to make disability
determinations without regard to mitigating measures." In fact, the clar-
ity of the legislative history and the unusually clear record of agreement
in Congress on the meaning of a significant provision in a civil rights
statute are surprising, given the Court's holdings in the three cases.
Moreover, Congress intended that law developed under the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973, "5 be used in interpreting claims under Title 1 of
the ADA, where the provisions of the acts are consistent.6 The definition
of "handicap" (the Rehabilitation Act uses the term handicap instead of
disability) under the Rehabilitation Act is almost identical to the defini-
tion of "disability" under the ADA.' 7 The Rehabilitation Act arguably
protects individuals with impairments that can be mitigated by medica-
tion or other means.'6 Where the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act and
Title I of the ADA do not conflict, courts should apply the interpretation
160. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2144.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 2161-62 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207.
164. See supra note 17.
165. Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)).
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1994); See also Vande Zande v.
Wisconsin Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 542 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that the decisions made
regarding regulations of the EEOC under the Rehabilitation Act can be used to interpret the same
terms under the ADA).
167. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994) with 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
168. Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87, 93 (D.C. 1997) (specifically holding that the
Rehabilitation Act does protect individuals with impairments that are mitigated by medication and
applying the EEOC interpretive guidelines for the ADA to a claim under the Rehabilitation Act); see
also Strathie v. Dept. of Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (finding a hearing impaired
individual, who alleged his hearing impairment could be mitigated, to be a "handicapped person"
under the Rehabilitation Act). Strathie actually demonstrates one of the potential problems with the
Sutton analysis. Strathie had to allege his condition could be effectively mitigated in order to prove
he was "qualified," and that he could be accommodated under state requirements for school bus
drivers. Strathie, 716 F.2d at 231. Thus, the Third Circuit considered the mitigation issue at the
logical stage of analysis, i.e., the "qualification" stage. id. Under Sutton, Strathie might never have
gotten to that issue, because his ability to mitigate might remove him from protection because he
would not be considered disabled.
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of the former to interpret the ADA.'69 Moreover, Congress was aware of
the broad definition of "handicap" in the Rehabilitation Act when it used
that definition as the template for the definition of "disability" under the
ADA.'7" This is yet another indication that the Court erred in its interpre-
tation on the mitigation issue.
It is also important to point out that most federal appellate courts to
consider the issue prior to the Supreme Court's recent pronouncements,
held that disability determinations should be made without regard to
mitigating measures.'' While even a substantial number of lower court
opinions do not bind the Supreme Court, when those interpretations are
added to the agency interpretations, legislative history, and the law de-
veloped under the Rehabilitation Act, it becomes apparent that the Court
erred.
A corollary to the Court's "individualized" assessment analysis is
the suggestion that allowing courts to make disability determinations
without regard to mitigating measures would lead to "the anomalous
result" that side effects of medications could not be considered in the
disability determination. This is a very weak argument: If an individual
with a disability is taking medication, and the medication causes severe
side effects, the underlying disability is likely to be substantially limiting
without regard to the mitigating measures. If the side effects of the medi-
cation treating an impairment are more severe than the impairment itself,
it is unlikely an individual would be prescribed such treatment. The
Court might counter that a progressive or fatal disease that poses few
outward limitations may be slowed or cured by a course of treatment that
causes significant limitations in other major life activities. To the extent
that such situations arise, Bragdon would seem to suggest that the un-
derlying condition would still be substantially limiting in regard to a
major life activity(s).' 3 Moreover, as Justice Stevens points out in regard
to the Court's analysis on this point:
It seems safe to assume that most individuals who take medication
that itself substantially limits a major life activity would be substan-
tially limited in some other way if they did not take the medication..
.To the extent that certain people may be substantially limited only
when taking "mitigating measures," it might fairly be said that just as
contagiousness is symptomatic of a disability because an individual's
'contagiousness and her physical impairment each [may result] from
the same underlying condition, side effects are symptomatic of a dis-
169. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c) (1998).
170. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153, 2155 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See supra note 19.
172. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at2147.
173. See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
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ability because side effects and a physical impairment may flow from
the same underlying condition.1
7
1
Thus, this position adds little to the Court's assertion that "by its terms,
the ADA cannot be read" to require disability determinations to be made
based on an individual's impairment in an unmitigated state. '75
3) Legislative Findings
Ironically, the Court attempts to strengthen its argument, that miti-
gating measures must be considered in disability determinations by re-
lying on the Act's legislative history which states that "some 43,000,000
Americans have one or more physical or mental disabilities, and this
number is increasing as the population as a whole is growing older.' 76 If
disability is determined without regard to mitigating measures, the num-
ber of individuals covered is likely to be much higher.17 This is the
Court's third basis for its holding. The Court relied, at least in part, on
the legislative history of the Act to find that Congress intended the ADA
to cover the approximately 43,000,000 citizens cited in the reports.'78 If,
as the Court asserts, the legislative history is not relevant to the mitiga-
tion issue due to the "plain language" of the statute, it would also be ir-
relevant to how many people were intended to be covered in light of
mitigation.'79 In essence, the Court is utilizing legislative history on a
tangential point to avoid the legislative history that directly contradicts
its reading of that issue. '
Without the legislative history used by the Court, we are left with
the figure of 43,000,000 contained in the Act.'"' This figure is contained
in a broad legislative findings section of the Act, and not in any specific
provision. While the use of this figure in the Act would seem to support
the Court's position, it is not a specific provision, and is a weak basis for
countering all of the countervailing evidence outlined in this Article.
Moreover, the language surrounding this figure-i.e., "is growing,"
demonstrates that Congress intended the number to be flexible.'82 Addi-
tionally, in deriving its interpretation based on the figure, the Court relies
in part on an Article (and studies cited therein) written by Professor Rob-
ert Burgdorf, a key figure involved in drafting the ADA.'8 3 As a general
174. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2159 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
175. Id. at 2146.
176. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994).
177. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48.
178. Id.
179. This demonstrates the odd way in which the Court deals with the legislative history and
agency interpretations in Sutton. See also infra notes 247-250 and accompanying text.
180. Compare Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48 with supra note 17.
181. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147-48.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(l) (1994).
183. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at2147.
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matter, however, Professor Burgdorf s Article does not support the
Court's interpretation, and in fact, implies quite the opposite result."
It seems the Court is concerned that if it allows courts to make dis-
ability determinations without regard to mitigating measures there will
be too many claims brought under the ADA.85 If that were the case,
Congress could amend the statute. 86 As the courts, including members of
the Sutton, majority have pointed out in other decisions, that is not the
Court's job. The Court should not use such tenuous reasoning to limit
rights in a poorly reasoned manner because of a fear of too many law-
suits. In fact, the Court has interpreted other civil rights statutes to cover
even larger segments of society. For example, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19648' in effect covers every employee.'88
There is no reason to artificially limit who is covered under the
ADA, especially because the determination of whether someone is a
"qualified individual with a disability" resolves many of the cases about
which the Court seems concerned. It is not the Court's role to erect artifi-
cial gates at the threshold of the ADA. Unfortunately, such a result-
oriented approach was inherent in the reasoning in Sutton and Murphy;
and in Kirkingburg, to the extent it follows Sutton and Murphy. Still,
despite the artificial limitations created by the Court, the "regarded as"
element of the ADA's definition of "disability" would seem, at least at
first glance, to provide an alternative means for many eliminated from
coverage to remain protected under the Act.'89 As will be discussed in the
next section, however, the Court significantly limits that option as well."'
B. Defining "Regarded As" Having An Impairment Under The ADA
Despite the limitations wrought by the Court's analysis of the first
element of the definition of "disability," the "regarded as" element might
help some of those excluded from coverage under the Court's approach.
The Court, however, placed considerable limitations on this element as
well;" ' but, as will be discussed in Part IV, both the "regarded as" and the
184. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 434-35 n. 117, 445-49.
185. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2148, 2160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Of course, the fact that the Congress could do so does not mean it should or would do so.
If separation of powers means anything, however, it is not for the Court to amend a statute that is
within Congress' enumerated powers.
187. 42 U.S.C. §2000e et seq. (1994); see also MacDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 279 (1976) (applying Title VII to whites, despite Congressional focus on protecting blacks
in passing Title VII).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2)(a) (1994); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2157-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
infra notes 205-06 and accompanying text.
189. See infra Part IV (evaluating the avenues that remain for people seeking coverage under
the ADA).
190. See infra Part IV (explaining that this element of the definition, although limited by these
cases, may continue to provide several other avenues of coverage).
191. See supra Part I.A-C (analyzing the Court's holdings in Sutton, Murphy, and
Kirkingburg).
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"record of' elements may still provide coverage for some of the indi-
viduals excluded from coverage by the Court's interpretation of the first
element of the ADA definition of disability.
In Sutton, the Court began its discussion of the "regarded as" ele-
ment by explaining that "[tlhere are two apparent ways in which indi-
viduals may fall within this statutory definition . *...""' First, an em-
ployer or other covered entity could "mistakenly" believe that an indi-
vidual has an impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities.'93 Second, a covered entity could "mistakenly" believe "that an
actual, non-limiting impairment substantially limits one or more major
life activities.""'9 It is the second point that may be of greatest use to
those denied coverage under the first element of the ADA definition of
"disability," because of the mitigated state of their impairments. The
Court's broad explanation of the "regarded as" element is very much in
keeping with prior interpretations of that provision.'95 While this seems,
at first glance, to be quite expansive, the Court later placed some signifi-
cant limitations on this provision.
There are two key ways in which the Court limited the "regarded as"
element in Sutton and Murphy. First, the Court examined whether an
employer regards an employee as substantially limited in a specific major
life activity or activities.' 6 Under this analysis, an employer who is igno-
rant about a particular disability, and therefore does not understand what
major life activities might be affected, can simply stereotype an em-
ployee/applicant without regarding that employee/applicant as substan-
tially impaired in regard to any particular life activity. If the disability is
mitigated when the employer learns of it, the employer may be less likely
to recognize a substantial limitation on any particular major life activity.
The employer simply may view some, or all, disabled individuals as gen-
erally impaired. It would be in keeping with the purpose of the Act to
allow a disabled employee/applicant in this situation to bring a claim
under the "regarded as" provision, because such stereotyping in em-
ployment decisions is a focus of the Act, and specifically of the "re-
garded as" provision. It is unclear how the Court's interpretation will
affect such claims because the Court does not specifically address this
issue. Of course, what motivates a given entity to discriminate-i.e., a
general bias or one tied to a limitation on a specific life activity or activi-
ties-is going to be a question of proof in each case.
The second limitation in the opinions is clearer, and perhaps more
troubling. That limitation relates to the specific major life activity at is-
192. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (1998).
196. Murphy, 119 S. Ct. 2133, 2138 (1999); Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
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sue in both cases-working. The Court is quite clear that in order to be
substantially limited in the major life activity of working, one must be
limited in regard to "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes as compared to the average person having comparable
training, skills and abilities."'97 Therefore, the inability to perform a par-
ticular job, including the one sought by a complaining em-
ployee/applicant, is insufficient.'95 Interestingly, while not deciding on
the validity of the EEOC regulations that it ignored in the mitigation
context, the Court does rely on those regulations for this characterization
of the life activity of working.'99 The Court's interpretation is in keeping
with those guidelines, but it is contrary to the interpretation of Professor
Burgdorf, whose article the Court relies on elsewhere in the opinion.'
Burgdorf specifically states that the EEOC interpretation of this issue is
not in keeping with the intent underlying the Act.
0'
Significantly, the Court's analysis of the major life activity of work-
ing is relevant to the first element of the disability definition as well as to
the "regarded as" element, but because of the way in which the Court
decided the mitigating measures question, the "working" analysis is par-
ticularly troubling in the "regarded as" context. For example, if Jason,
the schizophrenic employee from the hypothetical above, effectively
mitigates his impairment through medication, and his employer never-
theless terminates him based on his "disability," he is not considered
disabled. He might be "regarded as" disabled if the employer "regarded"
him as disabled in reference to a specific major life activity, such as
thinking or working, generally, but the employer can simply claim that
he regarded Jason as impaired only with reference to doing his particular
job and not to thinking or working in general. Under Sutton and Murphy
the employer can presumably do so, as Jason is not disabled since he is
able to mitigate the symptoms of his illness.
As will be explained in Part IV, Kirkingburg explicitly, and Sutton
implicitly, recognize that substantial limitations in life activities other
than working might be easier to establish.2 For example, had the pilots
in Sutton been allowed to assert "seeing" as the major life activity af-
fected, they may have had a very good argument on the "regarded as"
issue. 3 Working is essentially the life activity of last resort in ADA
cases. °' Because, however, most disabilities affect, or may be "regarded
197. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2151 (citations ommitted).
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 2147.
201. Burgdorf, supra note 11, at 522 n.186.
202. SeeSutton, 119 S. Ct. at2151;Kirkingburg, l19S. Ct. at2168.
203. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2152. That this would not have helped them under the statutory
definition of disability because their condition was effectively mitigated. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)
(1994) See note 50, supra, for a discussion of the lower court's reasoning on the life activity of
seeing.
204. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3)(i) (1999).
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as" affecting major life activities other than working, the Court's "re-
garded as" analysis may have more impact on litigation tactics than re-
sults. Thus, a possible side benefit of the Court's analysis may be that
claims that would have been based on the life activity of working, when
other more, obvious activities could have been used, will now be brought
based on those activities. Still, it is important to remember that in some
cases working is the only activity an employee can prove is "substan-
tially" limited, and the Court's mitigation analysis may in fact make such
cases more common.
As noted above, the Court's analysis can lead to perverse results. For
example, the employer in Sutton seems to have regarded the pilots as
substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing, yet because the
employer alleged that it only viewed them as limited in regard to work-
ing a particular job, the Court held they were not covered by the ADA
(ironically, even if they had been, they may have failed the "qualified"
test). Thus, if an employer alleges that it "regards" an employee as im-
paired with respect to that employee's particular job (rather than another
life activity which may actually be the employer's focus), the employer
may effectively remove the employee from ADA coverage. Perhaps this
was not the Court's intent, and the employee might be able to prove oth-
erwise in some cases, but because in a "regarded as" claim the em-
ployer's perceptions are at issue, the employer may find it easy to defend
its discriminatory actions.
Finally, while a "regarded as" claim may provide an alternative for
some individuals no longer considered disabled under the Court's analy-
sis, in many cases it will not help those disabled individuals thus re-
moved from coverage. For example, in the first hypothetical above,
Michele is probably not "disabled" under the Court's approach, because
her disability is effectively mitigated by medication. Moreover, when she
is denied the reasonable accommodation she requests, she is not "re-
garded as" disabled, because the employer is simply denying her ac-
commodation, not taking action against her based on a perception of her
disability. Thus, in order to be eligible for the small accommodation that
would prevent her from having a seizure, she must have a seizure, so that
she can meet the Court's definition of "disabled."20 5 If the employer later
takes action against her based on a mistaken perception of her disability,
she might then have a "regarded as" claim. This is significant because
"regarded as" claims are most likely to be useful in cases of disparate
treatment, but may not be terribly helpful when, as in Michele's case, an
employee is denied a reasonable accommodation. The "regarded as"
element will be discussed further in Part IV.
205. But see Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (suggesting another
possible argument to prove Michelle's disability in the hypothetical discussed throughout this
paper).
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III. MUDDYING THE WATERS: THE COURT'S DEVIATION FROM
ACCEPTED METHODS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND DEFERENCE
TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY LAW
In one fell swoop the Court has used these three cases, most notably
Sutton, to deviate from accepted methods of statutory construction and
precedent regarding deference to administrative agency interpretations.
While the deviations were clearly necessary for the Court to justify
reaching the conclusions it did, they raise questions for the future of
both, with the possibility of consequences far removed from the particu-
lar arena of the ADA.
A. The Nitty Gritty
2w
It has long been held that in "all" cases of statutory construction, the
Court must review the purposes promulgated by Congress, and interpret
the words of statutes in light of those purposes.' In the Act, Congress
expressly stated that "the purpose of [the ADA is] to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.""2 8 The ADA also expressly prohibits
covered entities from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual
with a disability because of the disability" in any of the terms, condi-
tions, and privileges of employment.2' These words, clearly and ex-
pressly set out in the Act, would seem on their face to direct the Court's
interpretation of the Act in relation to determining a disability. Until
now, they arguably have. After Sutton, however, the definition of dis-
ability itself has changed.2 ' While the Court may argue that it continues
to follow the mandates of Congress, the change in definition and the di-
rection this Court has taken in the determination of disability, the inter-
pretation of "major life activity," and the "regarded as" clause lead to-
ward an approach different from that Congress suggests in the Act..
Statutory interpretation has always begun with an examination of
three things, the result depending on what one finds in each.2 1 Histori-
cally, courts have always examined first the "plain language" of the stat-
ute to determine if it speaks directly and clearly to the issue at hand.2  If
206. This section is a basic explanation of general standards of statutory construction, as well as
standards of review for Article III courts and administrative agencies. Although it is no doubt
unnecessary to spend time on these for those familiar with the procedural aspects of court review, we
felt that the far-reaching implications of these cases require us to provide some background for those
who may be unfamiliar. This Article will also highlight the differences in the standards, and
therefore the basic importance of the deviations made by the Sutton court. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct.
2139.
207. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2153 (citing Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S.
600, 608 (1979)).
208. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (1994)).
209. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994)).
210. Id. at 2139.
211. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 489 (1917).
212. See id. at 485.
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it does, that is often the end of the examination because the court is able
to determine Congress' purpose and intent directly." '
If, however, the "plain language" of the statute is unclear, or if the
court needs clarification of the language, a court will generally look to
the legislative history of the statute."4 This will consist of all legislative
parts that became part of the final bill.25 Depending on the complexity of
the statute and/or the overall enormity of the struggle to create it, this
history may consist of a number of parts, including, but not limited to,
the original bills from both Houses of Congress, the Committee Reports
from each House, the Joint Committee Reports, any hearings which took
place (including the testimony of witnesses), and, the words of the indi-
vidual Representatives and Senators themselves, all of which culminate
to represent the intent of Congress.26 The court will generally use this
cumulative history to shed light upon vague or missing language in the
statute, or to bolster the plain meaning of the statute."7 (As will be dis-
cussed below, the Court in Sutton in fact used favorable legislative his-
tory to bolster its holding; however, much of the consternation about the
case is that the Court refused to look at more relevant history.) Where a
court finds that societal changes dictate a change in the current law, it
may also examine the legislative history for support in promulgating a
new policy.2 8
This general statutory construction pertains to all statutes, whether
they are subject to administrative agency interpretation or not. Courts
may differ as to the actual meaning of the "plain language," which may
not be so plain, after all. Similarly, courts may differ as to the meaning
of, and reliance on, different parts of the legislative history.
The real differences in statutory review relate more to where the case
came from that what it says.2 9 Generally, courts review administrative
agency decisions under a highly deferential standard.2 The Court has
based this standard on the general purpose of administrative agencies: to
provide a level of expertise not possessed by courts, in a less formal,
costly, and time-consuming manner.22 Because these purposes would be
nullified if courts were constantly second-guessing the expertise of the
213. See id.
214. See id. at 489.




219. There are, of course, key differences in the way in which courts review decisions,
depending on their origin. Decisions from Article III courts are reviewed under a range of standards,
depending on the type of action under review and ranging from little to great deference to the lower
court. However, administrative regulations generally carry a much higher standard of deference. See
Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
220. See Chevron,467 U.S. at 843-44.
221. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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agencies, the Supreme Court has ruled that courts should only overturn
agency decisions when they are clearly undeserving of such a high level
of deference.222
This Article will not attempt to discuss the appropriateness of the
highly deferential standard of review afforded administrative agencies;
that subject has been, and likely will continue to be, ripe for academic
debate for years to come.
Or maybe not.
The standard of deference afforded administrative agency decisions
is derived from (1) a number of cases dealing with the growing power of
such agencies, (2) the Court's reluctance to insert itself into the adminis-
trative process, and (3) the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), passed
by Congress to provide uniformity in administrative agency law. 223 Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe224 involved the authorization
by the Secretary of Transportation of federal highway funds for con-
struction of a highway through a city park. In remanding, the Court held
that it would not undertake a de novo review of the Secretary's decision,
and that the Court, while making a "substantial inquiry" into the action,
would nevertheless give the Secretary's decision the "presumption of
regularity." '25 Although Overton Park theoretically stands for greater
review-ability of agency decisions in the absence of a specific statute
precluding review,26 the Court also held that a court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the agency, but may only review the agency deci-
sion for reasonableness in light of a required record.2 7 Even while
stressing greater review-ability for certain agency decisions, the case
contributed to the higher standard of deference for agency decisions.
Two years later, in 1978, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in Ver-
mont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., which had remanded a case involving the Atomic Energy Com-
mission, with respect to the licensing of nuclear reactors.2 9 The Court
held that Congress had established the maximum rulemaking procedures
it wished the courts to impose on federal agencies. 30 While the agencies
themselves are free to add to those procedures in the exercise of their
discretion, the courts may not impose additional procedures as long as
222. See id. at 843-44.
223. 5 U.S.C. § 551-59 (1994).
224. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
225. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 415.
226. RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 133 (1992).
227. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
228. Id. at 413-14.
229. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978).
230. See id. at 557-58.
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the agency has provided at least the statutory minimum, regardless of
whether the court determines more would have been reasonable."'
While Overton Park and Vermont Yankee dealt with deference to the
agency decision-making processes, in 1984 the Court spelled out the
precise test to determine if and when a court may interfere at all in this
process."2 In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., the Court held that, with regard to judicial review of an agency's
construction of the statute which it administers, if Congress has not di-
rectly spoken to the precise question at issue, "the question for the court
is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute." '33
In application, this breaks down to a two-part test. First, did Con-
gress speak directly to the issue? In other words, is there plain language
on the subject and is it clear?... If so, the court's inquiry essentially ends,
and the decision of the agency is deferred to so long as it followed the
Congressional mandate.' However, if Congress was silent, vague, or
ambiguous on the subject, the court must then examine the legislative
history of the statute; but again only to determine if the agency's decision
was based on a permissible construction. 36
Congress passed the APA to achieve uniformity in the procedures of
administrative agencies. The APA's provisions, generally read together
with the case law, similarly require a reviewing court to set aside agency
findings and conclusions only when the court finds that they may be "ar-
bitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law." '37 The APA therefore, in words and practice, strengthens the
deferential treatment accorded to agency decisions by the courts.
Although a quite basic analysis of the recognized deference due ad-
ministrative agency law and interpretations, the above discussion illumi-
231. See id.
232. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
43 (1984).
233. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
234. See id. at 842-43.
235. See id. at 843-44.
236. See id. See also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1990) (holding that the
EEOC interpretation of the statute exceeded the deference allowed); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 142 (1976) (establishing that where an agency was not authorized to promulgate rules
or regulations concerning the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, the level of deference afforded "will
depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consis-
tency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control."); Fallacaro v. Richardson, 965 F. Supp. 87 (D.C. 1997) (exemplifying that
even where the agency is not authorized, the courts have used an alternative means to give deference
to their interpretations). But see Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2145-46 (1999)
(ignoring any alternative reasoning).
237. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413-14 (1971) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A)-(D) (1994)).
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nates the Sutton Court's failure to follow even such basic guidelines. The
Sutton Court offers little or no explanation for the deviation.
B. New Rules, New Results
At first, the Sutton Court appears to follow the Chevron analysis,
laying out petitioners' argument that the ADA does not clearly address
the definition of disability, and that therefore the Court should defer to
the agency interpretations of the EEOC and the DOJ.23' The Court then
discusses respondents' argument that the language of the ADA is clear,
and that the agency guidelines conflict with it. The respondents contend-
edtherefore that the Court should merely look at the plain language and
uphold respondents' argument; or in the alternative, if the language is
indeed ambiguous, determine that the agency interpretations are still in-
accurate. 239 The Sutton Court agrees with respondents that the agency
interpretations clash with the plain language of the statute, and further
that because Congress spoke clearly to the issue, there is no reason to
even address the legislative history of the ADA.2'
The Court discusses at length just how and why the ADA spoke to
the issue. The Court reads the three provisions of the ADA, which deal
with the determination here, in concert. The Court holds that when read
this way, it is clear that Congress "plainly" spoke to the issue."' The
Court reads the terms "disability" as defined in the ADA to be a mental
or physical impairment which "substantially limits" one of the major life
activities at present-not potentially or hypothetically.24 2 The Court relies
on its conception of the "individualized basis" analysis at this initial
stage to hold that persons should be judged in their corrected state, and
found that any other analysis is contrary to this individualized approach
mandated by the ADA. 23 The Court acknowledges that a person with a
controlled disability still has an impairment, but holds that it does not, at
least necessarily, at present "substantially limit" a major life activity. "
One is faced with the curious question of just how (or if) the Court
actually applied the Chevron test. As noted above, the Court determined
that Congress spoke to the definition of "disability" in the ADA, reading
the three parts in concert2l' and thus determined that there was no reason
to examine the legislative history of the Act.24 Yet the Court curiously
does look to the legislative history to strengthen its view of the defini-
238. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2146.
239. See id.
240. Id. at 2146.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 2149.
243. See id. at 2147.
244. See id. at 2149.
245. See id.
246. See id. at 2146.
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tional language and individualized approach of the Act.24 7 It relies on this
history to assert that Congress never intended to cover persons with
"controlled" disabilities, only those who have "substantial limitations"
now. 48 In rejecting the very need to examine the bulk of the legislative
history, which clearly contradicts its holding here, while using the small
portion that nebulously supports it, the Court appears to be having its
cake and eating it too.
The legislative history, which the Court refuses to consider, deter-
mining instead that there is no need to do so because the "plain language'
is clear, refutes much of the Court's reasoning here. While the Court
focuses on subsections (A), dealing with the definition of disability, and
(C), the "regarded as" section, the Court speaks little of subsection (B),
which states that the term "disability," with respect to an individual, also
takes into account "a record of such an impairment." ' 9 (In his dissent,
Justice Stevens argues that these words clearly indicate Congress' intent
to cover persons with previous impairments, including those that may be
totally controlled in the present.)25°
Another disturbing aspect of the Court's approach here is the ab-
sence of any reliance on its recent holding in Bragdon; or more specifi-
cally, on its adherence in Bragdon to the legislative history of the ADA
in reaching its holding.25' While the subject matter in Bragdon is clearly
different (involving an asymptomatic HIV patient), the Court, in holding
that respondent's condition was a covered disability under the ADA,
discussed the ADA's virtual adoption of the definition of "handicapped
individual" in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as well as that in the Fair
Housing Act Amendments of 1988.252 In discussing the almost verbatim
lifting of language from those Acts to the definitional section of the
ADA, the Court held "Congress' repetition of a well-established term
carries the implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in
accordance with pre-existing regulatory interpretations. ' ' 3 The Bragdon
Court pointed out that Congress not only adopted the virtually identical
definitions in the ADA, but further provided a specific statutory provi-
sion in the Act to ensure the construction of these terms in accordance
with those of its predecessor Acts, instructing that "[e]xcept as otherwise
247. See id. at 2147.
248. See id. at 2149.
249. See id. at 2144 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) (1994)) (emphasis
added).
250. See id.
251. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
252. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 631, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (1998) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994); 42
U.S.C. § 3602(h)(1) (1994)).
253. See id. See also FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437-38 (1986); Commis-
sioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1965); ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65, (1945) (dem-
onstrating the long-held and still valid analysis of statutory construction, an analysis which seems to
be inexplicably missing in Sutton and its companion cases).
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provided.., nothing in this [ADA] chapter shall be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the standards applied under [the previous Acts]."'
As discussed below, the legislative history of the ADA discussed by the
Sutton Court similarly makes clear Congress' intent that the Act cover
those individuals both with a record of impairment and without consid-
eration of mitigating factors." Yet the Sutton Court clearly, though inex-
plicably, repudiates some of the same legislative history it so clearly em-
braced in Bragdon, leaving only questions in its wake.
Specifically, because the Court does look to at least parts of the leg-
islative history to bolster its new definition, it is even more confusing
that it would ignore precedent on what history should be considered as
well as the actual history available. Then-Justice Rehnquist stated in
Garcia v. United States 6 that "[i]n surveying legislative history we have
repeatedly stated that the authoritative source for finding the Legisla-
ture's intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill ...."'
The Committee Reports on the ADA are quite specific as to who
should be covered under the bill, and contradict much of the Court's de-
cision here. The Senate Report states "whether a person has a disability
should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating meas-
ures, such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids."" The report
goes on to say in pertinent part:
[an] important goal of the third prong of the [disability] definition is
to ensure that persons with medical conditions that are under control,
and that therefore do not currently limit major life activities, are not
discriminated against on the basis of their medical conditions....
Such denials are the result of negative attitudes and misinformation.5 9
The House Committees adopted and appeared to strengthen the
wording from the Senate, in that "[t]hey clarified that 'correctable' or
'controllable' disabilities were covered in the first definitional prong as
well. ''2' The House Report goes on to state that "[t]he impairment should
be assessed without considering whether mitigating measures, such as
auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in less-than-
substantial limitation. '2 ' The House exemplified that statement by stat-
ing that the Act would cover persons such as those with hearing loss cor-
rected by hearing aids.62
254. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 631, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994)).
255. See infra, notes 257-264.
256. 469 U.S. 70 (1984).
257. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Garcia, 469 U.S. at 70).
258. See Sutton 119 S. Ct. at 2154 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23
(1989)).
259. S. REP. No. 101 -116, at 24 (emphasis added).
260. See S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 24.
261. See id. (emphasis added).
262. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 29.
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One of the clearest statements comes from the Report of the House
Committee on Education and Labor, which states that the assessment of
disability should be made "without regard to the availability of mitigat-
ing measures .. ..""' This report goes on to state the following:
For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited
in the major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be cor-
rected through the use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with im-
pairments, such as epilepsy or diabetes, which substantially limit a
major life activity are covered under the first prong of the definition
of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled by
medication.26
These reports appear to specifically contradict the Sutton Court's
conception of the first prong of the definitional test for disability as an
individualized assessment that depends on whether the individual is
functionally disabled at the present time.
Further, the Court's acknowledgment that persons with controlled
disabilities are still impaired, even though not presently so, is one of the
incongruities of the Court's decision. The Court clearly stated that a per-
son with an impairment corrected by mitigating measures still has an
impairment, the impairment however does not presently "substantially
limit" a major life activity.26 Later, the Court acknowledged that Con-
gress, in passing the Act, was concerned that "society's accumulated
myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are
the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment."2" It goes on
to explain that the "regarded as" prong was designed to cover individuals
"rejected from a job because of the 'myths, fears and stereotypes' associ-
ated with disabilities. 267 Yet the Court's holding here seemingly allows
an employer to freely reject a worker because she has a controlled dis-
ability which does not now rise to the level of substantial impairment of
a life activity, but who would need accommodation for the job to con-
tinue in a controlled state.
While the Court would argue that technically the employer is not
being given free reign to discriminate in this fashion, the unfortunate
result is likely to be just that. The rejected applicant, like Michele, can no
longer claim discrimination under the Court's approach to subsection (A)
because her disability is controlled by mitigating measures, and thus does
not "substantially limit" her in a life activity right now. Neither can she
claim discrimination under subsection (C), as the Court seems to leave
263. See id.
264. See id. (emphasis added).
265. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2149.
266. See id. at 2150.
267. See id.
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open,268 for the employer may not "regard her as" disabled in her con-
trolled state. In practice, the employer is now free to reject an applicant,
because of impairment, whom she would previously had to consider
without her regard to impairment. Even an applicant like Jason, who an
employer may "regard as" disabled even though his disability is con-
trolled, may not have redress if he is offered a lower paying position in
the "broad range of jobs." Justice Stevens points out in his dissent that
the ADA was enacted in great part to address just this issue: applicants,
such as Michele and Jason, are not generally "substantially limited" in
their mitigated condition, yet employers stereotype applicants on as-
sumptions "not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individu-
als to participate in, and contribute to, society."269 For applicants with
certain physical disabilities, particularly those dealing with mobility,
subsection (A) would appear easier to hurdle, because there is obviously
still a "substantial limitation" on most major life activities. But for those
like Michele or Jason, or the petitioners in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirking-
burg, the claim is far more difficult, and may result in true inequities.
Moreover, the dissent in Sutton points out that the Court has con-
sistently interpreted statutes dealing with discrimination broadly, even
when the class of individuals was beyond Congress' concern at the time
of passage."' When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, its aim was to protect African-Americans."' Yet the Court placed
great reliance on legislative history and accorded "great deference" to the
EEOC's interpretations of the Act to extend it to other groups, including
Caucasians. ' Thus the Court's interpretation here is not only unprece-
dented, it is actually opposite not only to its previous decisions but also
its earlier reasoning.
In fact, if the Court had agreed with all the entities which have pre-
viously interpreted the Act, and looked to the entirety of the legislative
history to determine if the agency's interpretation was a permlssible con-
struction of the statute, the outcome clearly could have been quite differ-
ent here. The bulk of the legislative history (possibly aside from, or even
despite, the very specific portion cited by the Court in its opinion), would
likely support the agency's interpretation as permissible. The Bragdon
Court relied on just such a "uniform body" of judicial and administrative
precedent in reaching its holding."' The Bragdon Court held that uni-
formity of precedent was "significant," finding that "[w]hen administra-
tive and judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing
statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indi-
cates, as a general matter, [Congress'] intent to incorporate [such] inter-
268. See id.
269. See id. at 2159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. See idat 2157.
271. See id.
272. See id. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976)).
273. Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2208.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
pretations as well. ' 74 Relying on this history to find a protected designa-
tion would not even have necessarily given petitioners a victory, how-
ever. As noted earlier, each of these cases could have, and very probably
would have, been upheld as applied against each of the petitioners based
on the specific qualifications needed for each of the positions, which
petitioners in each case were still not likely to meet. The Court, however,
appears to have chosen to use these cases instead to ignore years of
precedent and invalidate the statute for whole classes of people.
Another question that arises from Sutton and its instant progeny is
whether then, the Court has signaled a change in the tests and/or levels of
deference due administrative agency decisions. While it might be argued
that that would not necessarily be a bad thing, the application to these
cases shows that there is logic in the "presumption of regularity" given to
agency decisions, based on their presumed expertise and experience in
the subject areas. 7 ' No matter the original intention here, whether to
weaken the application of the ADA, or to affect the wholesale levels of
deference due administrative agencies in general, the holdings here may
well result in both.
One of the justifications used by the Court to withhold deference to
the three administrative agencies charged with implementing the Act is
that none of the agencies was specifically charged by Congress with the
authority to interpret the term "disability," and therefore, none is owed
deference in interpretation.76 This, again, is somewhat contradicted in the
Court's earlier holding in Bragdon.7 The Bragdon Court, in discussing
its reliance on the guidance of the DOJ and other agencies charged with
administering the ADA, held that the views of agencies charged with
implementing a statute "are entitled to deference. ,7 8 Bragdon follows a
line of cases with similar procedural holdings. 9 Clearly, Congress gave
none of the agencies involved there the direct authority to define the
terms under the ADA any more than they did here. Yet the Court in
Bragdon spoke of the agencies' responsibilities in implementing the Act,
presumably requiring the same determination of terms as was done here,
as entitling them to the deference due under Chevron and its progeny.:O
Most telling perhaps, is that the Bragdon Court specifically cited to
Chevron in arriving at these conclusions; a significant omission in Sut-
ton, and one which, as seen, triggers basic procedural questions about the
case.
274. See id. (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978).
275. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415 (1971).
276. See Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2145-46.
277. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 645, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2208 (1998).
278. See id. at 2209 (citing Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984)).
279. See, e.g., Skidmore v. Swift and Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138-40 (1944).
280. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 646, 118 S. Ct. at 2209 (citing Chevron v. Natural Resource Defense
Council, 467 U.S 837, 844 (1984)).
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There appears to be a clear conflict between the procedural posture
adopted only a year before in Bragdon and that adopted in Sutton. Fur-
ther, it is a conflict without a clear resolution; one that is likely to leave
the lower courts in confusion over whether Sutton is, indeed, a new di-
rection, or whether the lack of reference to Bragdon is a procedural door
left ajar for applicants. (As noted in Section IV below, Bragdon may also
contain a substantive door to slip through.) It would not be surprising,
perhaps, to see a new split in the circuits over the use and applicability of
Bragdon in the post-Sutton application of the ADA.
While the Court surely clouds the application of the traditional def-
erence tests to administrative agencies here, and arguably misapplies
them, it never actually acknowledges a change in the test. This alone may
well leave the lower courts without guidance, and injured employees
without recourse, in an already highly litigated area of law.
IV. AVOIDING THE POTENTIALLY HARSH RESULTS OF SUTTON AND
MURPHY
The Supreme Court's recent cases may be the death knell for many
ADA claims brought by individuals with impairments effectively treated
with medication or other means. Yet several avenues remain for such
individuals to be covered by the ADA. First, as noted in Part I.A. of this
Article, the Sutton Court left open the possibility that if a mitigating
measure itself causes a substantial limitation on a major life activity, the
individual is disabled."' For example, if an individual has high blood
pressure or epilepsy, and is able to mitigate the effects of the impairment
through medication, but the medication itself causes severe side effects
that substantially limit the individual in performing a major life activity,
that individual is "disabled" under the Court's analysis. Of course, under
the Court's analysis, even if the mitigating measure has no side effects, if
it does not mitigate the effect of the impairment sufficiently to prevent a
substantial limitation on a major life activity, the individual would be
disabled.
Significantly, in Bragdon, the Court recognized that asymptomatic
HIV infection is a disability. Specifically, it found that despite the lack of
significant outward symptoms at this stage of the disease, HIV easily
meets the definition of disability because it is an impairment that sub-
stantially limits an infected individual in a number of major life activities
(the one specifically alleged and addressed in that case was reproduc-
tion).2"2 Thus, the Court has recently held that an outwardly asympto-
matic impairment can be a disability if it still affects the body's systems
in a manner that places a substantial limitation on a major life activity or
281. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 119 S. Ct. 2139, 2146-47 (1999).
282. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 643, 118 S. Ct. at 2207. As explained in Part III, supra, Bragdon also
might limit some troubling aspects of the Sutton Court's procedural holdings.
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activities.283 Thus, while there is a huge difference between epilepsy and
HIV, and between the effectiveness of mitigating measures in regard to the
two diseases-Michele from the earlier hypothetical could argue that de-
spite the fact she is asymptomatic due to medication, since certain types of
flashing lights could still cause her to have a seizure, she does "presently"
have an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.
One problem with this argument, however, is the language from
Sutton, suggesting that a well-controlled diabetic would not necessarily
be disabled; a situation similar to Michele's."' In both cases the individ-
ual is well controlled, is no different from anyone else in most ways, and
will only have a problem if exposed to certain situations or substances
(flashing lights, deprivation of food, or excessive sugar). Therefore, in
both cases, one might argue based on Bragdon, that the individual has an
impairment that affects a major life activity or activities, but whether the
condition places a substantial limitation is called into question by
Sutton.28 Bragdon implies that HIV infection is a per se disability.288
Whether after Sutton other impairments might, as the Kirkingburg Court
suggests with regard to amblyopia, "ordinarily" meet the ADA's defini-
tion of disability, (and if so, which ones?) remain open question.:'
Moreover, while the Court significantly limited the "regarded as"
element in connection with the major life activity of working, Kirking-
burg suggests that other life activities can still provide a basis for a find-
ing of disability.288 While this may not be terribly helpful in regard to the
first element of the disability definition (the element discussed in Kirk-
ingburg) for those whose conditions are effectively mitigated, it may
prove very useful in the "regarded as" context. If an individual can dem-
onstrate that despite mitigation, he or she is regarded as substantially
limited in a major life activity such as seeing, hearing, walking, etc. The
ADA would apply. Thus, if the employer acts based on a mistaken per-
ception of an individual's disability, the individual would be covered
under the "regarded as" provision. Of course, because this relates only to
the threshold issue of whether the individual is protected under the ADA,
the individual must still prove that he is a "qualified individual with a
disability" and meet any other requirements under the Act for proving his
claim.
Another possible avenue left open by the Court is the "record of" an
impairment element, which is not directly addressed in any of the three
opinions. If an individual with a currently mitigated disability has a rec-
ord of an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity, such
283. Id. at 629-35.
284. Sutton, 119 S. Ct. at 2147.
285. Id. at 2146.
286. Bragdon, 524 U.S. 635-36, 118 S. Ct. at 2204.
287. Kirkingburg, 119 S. Ct. at 2169.
288. Id.
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as a record of the disability in its unmitigated state or from a time when
the mitigating measures did not mitigate the effects of the disability as
well, that individual could be covered. Of course, one would need to
demonstrate that a record exists, and that the employer relied on that
record.'89 Because such records may provide an easy basis for misjudging
a disabled employee's abilities regardless of mitigating measures, an
individual who has such a record could avoid the concerns created by the
Supreme Court's analysis by basing her claim on having a record of an
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or activities."
But again, this claim only helps an employee if such a record existed and
was relied upon by the employer.
Given the possibilities set forth in this section, it is essential for
those representing disabled individuals in ADA claims to understand
what the Court's recent decisions do and do not permit. In this regard, it
is important that courts applying the ADA remember that despite the
Court's decisions in Sutton, Murphy, and Kirkingburg, some individuals
with effectively mitigated impairments may still be covered under the
ADA. While the Court's analysis makes it much harder for individuals
with mitigated disabilities to be protected by the ADA, with the proper
proof, many such employees may remain covered for the reasons set
forth in this Part.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of what one thinks of the results in these cases, the Su-
preme Court's seemingly result-oriented approach appears questionable
given the fact that it goes against Congress' intent as embodied in the
ADA's legislative history, the interpretations of all three agencies
charged with implementing the Act, the decisions of most courts to ad-
dress the issues involved, and the language and structure of the Act as
reflected in alternative textual interpretations. The Court seems afraid
that too many people will be protected under the ADA, and that employ-
ers will suffer as a result. This is very troubling because that is a decision
for Congress to make, and Congress has spoken on that issue through the
Act and its legislative history. Perhaps after these cases, Congress will
more directly speak on the issue to correct what appears to go against its
intent, as it did in regard to several cases interpreting Title VII through
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
What is perhaps most troubling about these cases is that most of the
Court's concerns are already dealt with through the "qualified individual
with a disability" requirement. Thus, there is little risk of unqualified
commercial drivers or pilots taking to the roads or skies with the protec-
tion of the ADA. To the extent that such situations are possible, strength-
ening the application of the "qualified" element would be a method of
289. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(k) (1999).
290. See id.
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addressing such concerns that is far more consistent with the ADA's
underlying purpose and structure. As a result of these decisions many
employees who are qualified with mitigating measures, will be kept from
ever proving they are qualified or that they were discriminated against
based on their disabilities, because they are removed from coverage un-
der the Act. This might lower the number of questionable claims that
make it past the initial pleadings stage (an arguably positive result), but it
does so at the expense of the rights of many disabled individuals who
have been discriminated against on the basis of disability, but who are no
longer protected under the Act. This is a classic case of "throwing the
baby out with the bath-water," and to make matters worse, in this case
the Court used the wrong window.
